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Notes
Google—Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200:
Why the Tech Giant Is a “Bad” Monopoly
ALICIA GINSBERG†
Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 to promote competition and creativity in the
marketplace. The Sherman Act prohibits agreements that restrain trade and lays out rules
regarding monopoly power. This Note explores three distinct theories under which Google, one
of the most successful technology companies in the world, could be found to have violated the
Sherman Act. Specifically, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Google “ties” its
products together and forces mobile device manufacturers to sign exclusive dealing agreements
preventing them from purchasing products from Google’s competitors. Further, Google’s
systematic obstruction of competing Android operating systems is a form of anticompetitive
conduct in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This Note argues that Google is indisputably
leveraging its market power to restrain trade and maintain its monopoly in various relevant
markets.

† J.D. Candidate 2020, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Senior Notes Editor,
Hastings Law Journal. I am grateful to Professor Samuel Miller for his inspiration and guidance, the editors of
the Hastings Law Journal for their hard work, and my parents for their unconditional support.
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INTRODUCTION
Under U.S. antitrust laws, businesses may not take concerted private action
to improperly interfere in the functioning of competitive markets.1 In 1890, the
Sherman Act, the principle statute at the center of U.S. antitrust policy, was
designed to be a charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving competition in
trade,2 and a tool to protect the public from monopoly power.3 In 1914, the U.S.
federal government created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce
antitrust laws.4 The FTC’s mission is to “protect consumers and competition by
preventing anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices . . . without
unduly burdening legitimate business activity.”5 A core tenet of U.S. antitrust
policy is that unrestrained, unfettered interaction of competitive forces will yield
the best allocation of economic resources and lowest prices for consumers, while
simultaneously fostering an environment that is conducive to the preservation of
our democratic political and social institutions.6
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies “in restraint of trade or commerce.”7 This means that firms are
prohibited from agreeing amongst themselves to act in ways that harm the
markets in which they participate. While the language of the statute is broad,
courts have construed it narrowly, to preclude only contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies that unreasonably restrain competition through undue restraints.8
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is illegal to monopolize, attempt to
monopolize, or conspire with others to monopolize any part of trade or
commerce.9 Section 2 forbids the use of monopolistic power by making it illegal
for any single large business to try to exclude all or most of its competitors from
the marketplace.
Courts have grappled with striking a balance between assuring adequate
returns for innovation, protecting dominant firms’ opportunities for efficiency,
and foreclosing unnecessarily aggressive conduct likely to prolong monopolists’

1. See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1219, 1220, 1258
(1988) (discussing how two or more competitors might agree among themselves to suppress competition, thereby
creating a monopoly in a market in which there had previously been rivalry and why these agreements should
be held unenforceable).
2. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
3. See Millon, supra note 1, at 1220, 1260.
4. See The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
5. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
6. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 4.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
8. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (rationalizing that Congress did not
intend Section 1 to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts that do not unduly restrain interstate or foreign
commerce); see also Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918) (“Every board of trade and nearly
every trade organization imposes some restraint upon the conduct of business by its members.”).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
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income flow.10 Claims that allege violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act are evaluated on a case-by-case basis.11 This process requires a factintensive analysis and appraisal of the evidence, and courts must focus their
inquiries on the goal of protecting the competitive process from overly
aggressive strategies.12
Additionally, the antitrust legal system faces a new set of challenges with
the rise of technology and e-commerce markets.13 Issues of competition in hightechnology industries have different characteristics compared to those of
traditional markets, and courts must take these variances into account when
considering allegations of Sherman Act violations.14 For example, hightechnology companies like Google have the potential to grow, and have grown,
extremely fast, and many of their products are free for consumers to use.15
Additionally, high-technology companies are able to price goods below-cost in
order to build market share, and then expand into an array of adjacent businesses
to build an online infrastructure that their rivals depend on, giving them access
to the data their transactions generate.16 Courts must apply antitrust laws with
sensitivity to special characteristics of high-technology industries and recognize
the special role that competition plays in both stimulating innovation and in
disseminating the benefits of innovation to consumers.17
Currently, mobile device manufacturers (“manufacturers”) that want to
build and sell smartphones that run the latest version of the Android operating
system (“Android OS” or “Android”), and who wish to pre-install popular
Google mobile applications (“apps”), are required to sign contracts with
Google.18 These contracts require manufacturers to pre-install certain Google
apps as a condition for licensing other Google apps and Google’s version of
Android OS, thereby functioning as a way for Google to integrate more of its
services into Android.19 Additionally, Google offers revenue-sharing
agreements (RSAs) to manufacturers, which ensure that Google Search,
10. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Vertical Strategies by Dominant Firms,
21 SW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1262 (1992).
11. See id. at 1262–63.
12. See id.
13. See Clara Hendrickson & William A. Galston, Big Technology Firms Challenge Traditional
Assumptions About Antitrust Enforcement, BROOKINGS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
techtank/2017/12/06/big-technology-firms-challenge-traditional-assumptions-about-antitrust-enforcement/.
14. Doris Karina Oropeza Mendoza, Antitrust in the New Economy Case Google Inc. Against Economic
Competition on Web, 8 MEXICAN L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2016).
15. See Robert Levine, Antitrust Law Never Envisioned Massive Tech Companies like Google, BOS. GLOBE
(June 13, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2018/06/13/google-hugely-powerful-antitrust-law-job/
E1eqrlQ01g11DRM8I9FxwO/story.html.
16. See id.
17. William J. Baer, Former Dir., Bureau of Competition, Speech at the American Bar Association,
Sections of Business Law, Litigation, and Tort and Insurance Practice Conference: Antitrust Enforcement and
High Technology Markets (Nov. 12, 1998), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/11/antitrustenforcement-and-high-technology-markets.
18. See infra Subpart II.B.
19. See infra Part II.
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Google’s internet search app, is the only default and pre-installed internet search
on all devices manufacturers under contract will distribute.20 Finally, by
requiring manufacturers to sign anti-fragmentation agreements (AFAs) and
taking steps to decrease the compatibility between its apps and competitors’
versions of Android OS, Google obstructs the development and distribution of
alternative versions of Android.21
Google’s market strategy for its apps, internet search, and Android OS
closely resembles Microsoft’s strategy regarding its Windows operating system
(“Windows OS”) for personal computers (PCs), which resulted in a legal and
reputational nightmare for Microsoft. As explained in greater detail, in 2001, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held Microsoft liable for multiple violations of
antitrust law.22 First, although the D.C. Circuit remanded the district court’s
conclusion that Microsoft was liable for illegal tying of its flagship Internet
Explorer browser to its Windows OS, it provided a framework for analyzing a
tying arrangement when the tying product is platform software.23 Second, the
court held that Microsoft’s conduct in forming restrictive licensing agreements
with manufacturers was illegal.24 Third, Microsoft was found to have abused its
monopoly power by taking steps to intentionally restrict the development of
cross-platform programs for Java.25
These striking parallels between Google’s conduct and Microsoft’s
conduct raise legitimate antitrust concerns. During the Microsoft litigation, New
York Attorney General Dennis Vacco aptly stated that “[i]t would be unfortunate
if one company were allowed to control access to the Internet in violation of the
antitrust laws, restricting consumer choice and stifling competition before it has
a chance to develop.”26 His comment was aimed towards Microsoft; however,
these fears are just as relevant today as they were twenty years ago. Google’s
Android OS is regarded as “the Windows of the mobile device era, powering
nearly 80% of smartphones globally . . . . Windows commanded roughly 90
percent of the PC market in the 1990s.”27 Google’s enormous influence is
indisputable, and this Note proposes three theories under which Google may
have restrained trade and maintained its monopoly in violation of Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act.

20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
23. See id. at 89–95.
24. See id. at 61.
25. See id. at 75–77.
26. Richard B. McKenzie & William F. Shughart II, Is Microsoft a Monopolist?, 3 INDEP. REV. 165, 167
(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New York Attorney General Dennis Vacco).
27. Amir Efrati, With Shades of Microsoft, Google Android Invites Antitrust Case, INFO. (Oct. 16, 2014,
11:44 AM), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/With-Shades-of-Microsoft-Google-Android-InvitesAntitrust-Case.
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I. THREE THEORIES OF GOOGLE’S SHERMAN ACT VIOLATIONS
In order to state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff
must provide enough factual matter, taken as true, to suggest that (1) an
agreement exists between parties and (2) the agreement constitutes an
unreasonable restraint of trade.28 The crucial question is whether the challenged
conduct stems from independent decision-making or from an agreement.29 “An
agreement exists when there is a unity of purpose, a common design and
understanding, a meeting of the minds, or a conscious commitment to a common
scheme.”30 A plaintiff must show that the defendant purposefully joined and
participated in the conspiracy, by providing direct evidence, circumstantial
evidence, or a combination of the two.31
In order to state a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant (1) possesses monopoly power and (2) uses that
monopoly power to either foreclose competition, gain a competitive advantage,
or destroy a competitor.32 The inquiry is whether the firm has aggressively
suppressed competition on the merits, which is legal, or whether it has engaged
in conduct that impairs competitive opportunity, distorts the competitive
process, and makes market outcomes turn on power, which would be a violation
of Section 2.33 Thus, having a monopoly does not by itself violate Section 2—a
firm violates Section 2 only when it maintains, or attempts to maintain, its
monopoly by engaging in exclusionary conduct “as distinguished from growth
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident.”34 Therefore, there must be proof that the conduct harms the
competitive process and competition in general.35 Showing harm to one or more
competitors is not sufficient.36
In a case against Google, there are three viable theories of violations of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Each theory is addressed separately in the
following parts of this Note. Part II addresses the first theory, that Google
restrains trade and maintains its monopoly by tying the download of Google Play
and Google’s version of Android OS to the pre-installation of Google Search
and Google Chrome. Part III focuses on the second theory, that Google restrains
trade and maintains its monopoly by forcing mobile device manufacturers into
28. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 189–91 (2010).
29. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007).
30. W. Pa. Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010).
31. See id.; see also In re Processed Egg Prod. Antitrust Litig., 821 F. Supp. 2d 709, 720 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
32. Aerotec Int’l v. Honeywell Int’l, 836 F.3d 1171, 1183 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 482–83 (1992)).
33. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954); see also Sullivan, supra note 10, at 1229 (discussing the history of the formulation of
courts’ examination of power and conduct in monopolization cases).
34. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); see also United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
35. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985); see also United
States v. Dentsply Int’l, 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005).
36. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58.
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exclusive dealing arrangements in which they are required to pre-install Google
Search onto their devices. Part IV explores the third theory, that Google
maintains its monopoly by inhibiting the development and distribution of
alternative versions of Android OS.
II. TYING ARRANGEMENTS
A “tying arrangement” exists where a firm agrees to sell one product over
which it has market power, contingent on the condition that the buyer also
purchases a different product.37 The product the buyer wants is referred to as the
“tying product,” and the product the buyer is forced to take with the tying
product is the “tied product.”38 Anticompetitive tying arrangements have been
illegal in the United States since 1917, and can be challenged as a restraint of
trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and as an exclusionary act by a
dominant firm under Section 2.39 Anticompetitive tying arrangements are illegal
because they limit the purchaser’s freedom to buy products from other sources,40
thus inhibiting competition. In Northern Pacific Railway Co., the Supreme Court
explained the nefarious effects of tying arrangements:
[Tying arrangements] deny competitors free access to the market for the tied
product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better
product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another
market. At the same time buyers are forced to forego their free choice
between competing products.41

There are four essential elements of a tying claim: (1) the tying and tied
goods are two separate products; (2) the agreement to license one product is
conditioned on the license of another product; (3) the seller has market power in
the tying product market; and (4) the tying arrangement forecloses a substantial
volume of commerce.42
A. SEPARATE PRODUCTS
An illegal tying arrangement cannot exist unless the tying and tied products
are separate.43 To make that assessment, the Supreme Court has fashioned a test
driven by evidence of producer behavior and consumer demand, rather than on
a court’s own speculative, subjective effort to define boundaries of distinct
products. This inquiry focuses on the character of the demand for the two
products, rather than whether they were sold as a functionally integrated
package.44 The products can only be found separate if there is “sufficient
37. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958).
38. See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L.
REV. 925, 926 (2010).
39. A.B.A., 1 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 174 (Jonathan I. Gleklen et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012).
40. Id.
41. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6.
42. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
43. See generally Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
44. Id. at 19.
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consumer demand so that it is efficient for a firm to provide
[them] . . . separately.”45
Under this test, products are considered to be “separate” if they could be
profitably marketed separately.46 This can be satisfied if the plaintiff can show
that consumers want to purchase the products separately. If not, there is little
risk that the tying arrangement would prevent separate sales of the products.47
However, products can still be considered separate even if no consumer would
want one without the other.48 Hence, it is not a question of whether consumers
need or want both products, or even whether consumers would want one without
the other.49 So long as there could be a viable market for sales of one of the
products alone, they are considered separate.50
In Jefferson Parish, a hospital entered into an exclusive contract with an
anesthesiology firm, requiring every patient undergoing surgery at the hospital
to use the services of the contracted anesthesiology firm.51 The Supreme Court
held that anesthesiology and other hospital services are considered two separate
products for the purposes of the tying analysis.52 The Court reasoned that even
though no one would want surgery without anesthesia, people differentiate
between anesthesiological services and other hospital services, and therefore the
hospital’s arrangement involved the required purchase of two services that could
otherwise be purchased separately.53
Under a similar line of reasoning, the Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak
held that spare parts used for repair or replacement and equipment service for
copying machines are two separate products.54 The Court concluded that there
may be a demand for parts separate from service because at least some
consumers would purchase service without parts, some service does not require
parts, and some consumers would purchase parts without service.55 Therefore,
parts and service were considered two distinct products.56
In a case against Google, the tying products are Google Play (an Androidcompatible app store) and Google’s version of Android OS. The tied products
are Google Search and Google Chrome, Google’s internet search app and mobile
web browser app, respectively. Google’s version of Android OS is separate from

45. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992).
46. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 21–22.
47. Alexandra Mitretodis, What Constitutes a Separate Product?, COMPETITION CHRON. (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.competitionchronicle.com/2017/12/what-constitutes-a-separate-product/.
48. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 19 n.30 (“We have often found arrangements involving
functionally linked products at least one of which is useless without the other to be prohibited tying devices.”).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 21.
51. Id. at 4–5.
52. Id. at 25.
53. Id. at 23–24.
54. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462–63 (1992).
55. Id. at 463.
56. Id. at 462–63.
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its apps because each has a separate market demand and distinct purpose.57 Users
can use Android OS without using Google apps, and instead use apps from other
vendors. Other users may only want to use certain Google apps.58 Each app has
a separate name, installation package, and icon, and there is no technical reason
why one app may require the installation of another.59 During the Microsoft
litigation, the district court ruled that Windows OS and Internet Explorer were
separate products, recognizing that a browser program may be a separate product
from an operating system because consumers would select their browser
separately if given the option to choose.60 Similarly, the General Court of the
European Union (EU) found that Windows OS and Windows Media Player, a
PC program, were separate products.61 The FTC has also recognized internet
search as its own market.62 Moreover, in Pepper v. Apple, the Apple app store,
which is similar to Google Play but compatible only with the Apple mobile
device operating system, was recognized as a separate product from Apple’s
mobile operating system, iOS.63 Therefore, individual apps for internet search
and web browsing, Android-compatible app stores, and mobile device operating
systems constitute separate products for the purpose of a tying analysis.
B. COERCION
Where a consumer is free to take either product by itself, there is no tying.64
However, if a firm has made the joint purchase of two products the only viable
option, a jury may find that the defendant has effectively tied the two products
together.65 Some proof of coercion is required to establish that a buyer was
forced to purchase a product that the buyer did not want.66 Copies of Google’s
Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (MADA) provide proof of

57. Benjamin Edelman, Leveraging Market Power Through Tying: Does Google Behave AntiCompetitively, BEN EDELMAN (May 12, 2014), https://www.benedelman.org/publications/google-tying-201405-12.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 28.
60. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 49–51 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 253 F.3d 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reversing the liability finding of the district court on the per se tying
theory and remanding for further consideration of the tying claim under the rule of reason). The case settled
without a final determination on the tying theory; however, the Circuit Court’s discussion of tying is applicable
to Google. See Richard Richtmyer, No Microsoft Breakup: U.S., CNN MONEY (Sept. 6, 2001),
https://money.cnn.com/2001/09/06/technology/microsoft/.
61. Edelman, supra note 57, at 9.
62. See generally F.T.C. FILE NO. 071-0170, STATEMENT OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CONCERNING
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK
(2007),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/
071220googledc-commstmt.pdf (distinguishing between the search advertising market and other online
advertising markets and concluding that the search market is separate).
63. See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 323–24 (9th Cir. 2017).
64. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
65. See Tricom, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20158, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6,
1996) (“To prove an illegal tie, a plaintiff must show that the purchase of the tying product together with the tied
product was the purchaser’s only economically viable option.”).
66. See Paladin Assocs. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003).
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coercion.67 Key provisions of the MADA that show manufacturers must agree
to install all of the apps Google specifies include:
“Devices may only be distributed if all Google Applications . . . are preinstalled on the Device.”68
“Company will preload all Google Applications approved in the applicable
Territory or Territories on each Device.”69
“Search must be set as the default search provider for all Web search access
points on the Device.”70

Installing Google Search and Google Chrome is a prerequisite to installing
Google Play and Google’s version of Android.71 If manufacturers want a license
to pre-load one Google app, they have to take others along with it. Courts have
found that the requisite coercion can be proven by evidence of a contract.72
Therefore, these MADA provisions are sufficient to show that in order to
distribute Google Play and Google’s Android OS, manufacturers are forced to
select the only viable option—the pre-installation of Google Search and Google
Chrome.
C. MARKET POWER IN THE RELEVANT MARKETS
A market consists of all products in a geographic area that exert
competitive constraints on each other.73 A “relevant market,” for the purpose of
analyzing market power, includes all products that are reasonably
interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes and is defined in terms of
two components: the relevant geographic market and the relevant product
market.74
The relevant geographic market identifies the geographic area in which
businesses compete in marketing their products.75 It must “‘correspond to the
commercial realities’ of the industry and be economically significant.”76 In some
situations, the relevant geographic market may encompass an entire country, and
in others, it may constitute a single metropolitan area.77 For many high-

67. See Class Action Complaint at 32–33, Feitelson v. Google, 80 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (No.
5:14-cv-02007).
68. Exhibit B to Class Action Complaint at 3, Feitelson v. Google, 80 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (No.
5:14-cv-02007).
69. Id. at 4.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 3.
72. See Ungar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of Am., 531 F.2d 1211, 1224 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Amerinet, Inc. v.
Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1500 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Typically, an express refusal to sell the tying product without
the tied product is the basis for an illegal tying arrangement.”).
73. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
74. See id.; see also F.T.C. v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 268 (8th Cir. 1995).
75. F.T.C. v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing F.T.C. v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F.
Supp. 2d 109, 119 (D.D.C. 2004)).
76. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336–37 (1962) (footnote omitted) (quoting Am.
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-Am. Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)).
77. Id. at 337.
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technology products, including those that Google provides, the relevant
geographic market is at the very least the entire United States, if not the entire
world.78
The relevant product market identifies the competing products at issue.79
Products are considered to be in the same relevant market if consumers would
consider them potential alternatives to each other—in other words, if a consumer
can substitute an alternative product when the price of another product has
increased, the products would likely be considered in the same relevant market.
For the purposes of Google’s market power analysis, with respect to its tying
arrangements, the relevant product markets are internet search apps, browser
apps, Android-compatible app stores, and Android operating systems.
The concepts of “market power” and “monopoly power” both refer to
anticompetitive economic power that can ultimately compromise consumer
welfare.80 Although the Supreme Court has yet to write an opinion that
deliberately and explicitly contrasts these two terms, its chosen language in
separate cases has articulated standards for each.81 In NCAA v. Board of Regents,
the Court defined market power as “the ability to raise prices above those that
would be charged in a competitive market.”82 In United States v. E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., the Court defined monopoly power as “the power to control
prices or exclude competition” in the relevant market.83 However, because the
Supreme Court has been inconsistent about whether these two concepts are
similar or distinct,84 they will be used interchangeably for the purposes of this
Note.
Market power, or monopoly power, is the power to exclude competition in
the relevant market.85 If a consumer could readily use alternatives in the relevant
product market, an illegal monopoly does not exist.86 In other words, there is
monopoly power when a product is controlled by one firm and there are no
substitutes available.87 In the United States, a market share in excess of 70%
generally establishes a prima facie case of monopoly power,88 and an allegation

78. See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 197 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing how multichannel
video distribution markets are located nationwide, and it is therefore appropriate to derive a measure of
nationwide economic harm).
79. See Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d at 24.
80. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO.
L.J. 241, 246 (1987).
81. Id. at 246–47.
82. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984).
83. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
84. See Krattenmaker et al., supra note 80, at 246.
85. Samuel R. Miller, If Google Is a “Bad” Monopoly, What Should Be Done?, LAW360 (Oct. 22, 2013,
7:46 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/481993.
86. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 394.
87. Id.
88. See A.B.A., supra note 39, at 231.
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that a firm enjoys a 50–75% market share has been sufficient to state a
monopolization claim.89
As of September 2019, in the United States, Google held 94.26% of the
mobile search engine market share,90 and 40.21% of the mobile browser market
share.91 With regard to Google’s market share in the Android-compatible app
stores market, Google Play delivers over 95% of apps downloaded to Android
phones.92 According to Statcounter, an independent web analytics company, as
of September 2019, Android had 44.15% of the mobile device operating system
market share in the United States and 76.24% of the mobile device operating
system market share worldwide.93 Statista, an online statistics and market
research portal, lists Google’s market share in the mobile device operating
system market slightly higher. Statista reports that in June 2019, 51.1% of
smartphone subscribers in the United States were using a Google Android
device.94 In 2017, Android’s market share worldwide was 85.9%.95 Android’s
market share in the mobile device operating system market is by far the most
used operating system worldwide. Google’s dominance is evidence of its power
in the markets of its tying products, Google Search and Google Chrome.
D. FORECLOSURE OF COMMERCE
For a tying arrangement to be illegal, it must foreclose a substantial amount
of commerce in the tied product.96 Conclusory allegations of anticompetitive
effect are insufficient without supporting facts that show how competition in the
tied markets has actually been harmed, and that demonstrate how consumers
have suffered injury as a result of choices being limited because of the tied

89. LG Elecs. v. ASKO Appliances, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31571, at *14 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2010).
90. See Mobile Search Engine Market Share United States of America—Dec. 2018–Dec. 2019,
STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america (last
visited Mar. 20, 2020).
91. See Mobile Search Engine Market Share United States of America—Dec. 2018–Dec. 2019,
STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america (last
visited Mar. 20, 2020); see also Mobile Browser Market Share United States of America—Dec. 2018–Dec. 2019,
STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america (last visited
Mar. 20, 2020).
92. Peter Sayer, Google Faces $5B Fine Over Android Browser and Search Engine Ties,
COMPUTERWORLD (July 18, 2018, 8:18 AM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/3290471/google-faces5b-fine-over-android-browser-and-search-engine-ties.html.
93. See Mobile Operating System Market Share United States of America—Dec. 2018–Dec. 2019,
STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america (last visited Mar. 20,
2020); see also Mobile Operating System Market Share Worldwide—Dec. 2018–Dec. 2019, STATCOUNTER,
http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/worldwide (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
94. See Arne Holst, Subscriber Share Held by Smartphone Operating Systems in the United States from
2012 to 2019, STATISTA (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/266572/market-share-held-bysmartphone-platforms-in-the-united-states/.
95. See Arne Holst, Global Market Share Held by Smartphone Operating Systems from 2009 to 2017,
STATISTA (June 4, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/263453/global-market-share-held-by-smartphoneoperating-systems/.
96. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958).

April 2020]

GOOGLE: DO NOT PASS GO

795

products.97 There is compelling evidence that Google’s ties thwart competition
in the markets for the tied products.
Google has substantially hindered market access of creators of rival
Android-compatible app stores by tying Google Search and Google Chrome
with Google Play. While Android apps are available from a variety of Androidcompatible app stores, Google only makes its Google apps, which are popular
with consumers, available through Google Play.98 With Google Play delivering
over 95% of total apps downloaded to all Android phones worldwide,99 it is no
surprise that the European Commission (“Commission”) described Google Play
as a “must have” feature for manufacturers.100 It is by far the most important app
store for the Android operating system.
Companies like Amazon have been unsuccessful in persuading big-name
manufacturers to produce devices that connect to its app store.101 Amazon’s Fire
OS is an Android customization capable of running most of Google’s apps as
well as other apps in Google Play.102 However, since it is not Google’s version
of the Android operating system, manufacturers that program their devices with
Amazon Fire OS cannot pre-install their devices with Google Play.103 Only
Google Play permits manufacturers to offer users comprehensive access to
substantially all apps, including Google’s apps.104 Therefore, devices without
Google Play pre-installed are unattractive to consumers, consequently reducing
Amazon Fire OS’s desirability to manufacturers.105 By engaging in tying
arrangements, Google is leveraging its dominance of the Android-compatible
app store market to achieve an unfair advantage in the more competitive markets
for internet search and mobile browsing apps.106
Additionally, fewer than 10% of Android phone users download an
alternative browser app to the pre-installed Google Chrome app, and fewer than
1% download an alternative search app to the pre-installed Google Search
app.107 In 2016, 96% of all internet search queries were made using Google
Search on devices that had it pre-installed.108 This percentage fell to less than
25% on Windows Mobile, Microsoft’s mobile device operating system, where

97. In re Webkins Antitrust Litig., 695 F. Supp. 2d 987, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
98. Benjamin Edelman & Damien Geradin, Android and Competition Law: Exploring and Assessing
Google’s Practices in Mobile, 12 EUR. COMPETITION J. 159, 164 (2016).
99. See Sayer, supra note 92.
100. Alexandre de Cornière & Greg Taylor, On the Economics of the Google Android Case, VOXEU (Aug.
15, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/economics-google-android-case.
101. See Sayer, supra note 92.
102. Edelman, supra note 57, at 64.
103. Id.
104. Edelman & Geradin, supra note 98, at 171.
105. Id.
106. Cornière & Taylor, supra note 100.
107. See Sayer, supra note 92.
108. See Alex Barker & Mehreen Khan, EU Fines Google Record €4.3bn Over Android, FIN. TIMES (July
18, 2018, 1:53 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/56ae8282-89d7-11e8-b18d-0181731a0340; see also Cornière
& Taylor, supra note 100.
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Google Search was not pre-installed.109 These statistics show that the vast
majority of users do not download competing apps and tend to simply use those
apps that are pre-installed on their device.110 Competitors to Google’s search
engine and browser are unable to compete on the merits and are kept out of the
market by Google’s restrictions.111 Google’s ties obstruct competitors’ efforts to
make deals with manufacturers because manufacturers are not able to provide
them with default installation or exclusive placement.112 Competitors are forced
to lower their prices and that reduction in value may make the deal unworthy of
pursuing.113 Thus, Google’s tying arrangements foreclose a substantial amount
of commerce by unfairly eliminating the ability of its rivals to compete.
E.

HARM TO CONSUMERS

By imposing restrictions on Google Play and Google’s version of Android
OS, Google harms consumers. Google’s ties insulate Google from competition,
which harms consumers because the lack of competing vendors disincentivizes
Google from offering greater benefits to consumers.114 Some of these benefits
may include fewer advertisements or greater security protections against
deceptive offers.115 Users are deprived of these potential benefits because
Google’s ties shield it from usual competitive pressures.116 Moreover, by
foreclosing competing vendors, Google’s ties deprive consumers of choice in
their internet search provider.117 Because Google ties its apps with each other
and with its version of Android, consumers do not have an option to buy or
download apps or operating systems elsewhere.
If a manufacturer wants to substitute a Google app with a comparable app
developed by one of Google’s competitors, it would not be allowed to include
any of Google’s apps under Google’s MADA restrictions.118 There are many
reasons why a manufacturer might want to contract with another developer and
use a non-Google app. There may be alternatives that are faster, easier to use, or
provide more robust privacy protection.119 Thus, Google’s ties prevent thirdparty vendors from outcompeting Google’s apps on the merits, even if they offer
apps that are better than Google’s offering.120 This harms consumers because
users’ devices may not be programmed to function at their highest ability.
109. Cornière & Taylor, supra note 100.
110. See Barker & Khan, supra note 108.
111. See Sayer, supra note 92.
112. See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 98, at 171.
113. Id. at 172.
114. See Edelman, supra note 57, at 25.
115. See Benjamin Edelman, Secret Ties in Google’s “Open” Android, BEN EDELMAN (Feb. 13, 2014),
https://www.benedelman.org/news-021314/.
116. Id.
117. Nicholas Economides, What Google Can Learn from Microsoft’s Antitrust Problems, FORTUNE (July
19, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/07/17/europe-google-antitrust/.
118. See discussion supra notes 68–70.
119. See Edelman, supra note 115.
120. See id.
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Additionally, due to Google Play’s popularity, it has become necessary for
manufacturers to ensure that Google Play is pre-installed on their devices.121 If
a consumer purchases a device without Google Play pre-installed, the device
will lack easy installation of desired Google apps or other apps that are only
available through Google Play.122 Users may risk security vulnerabilities or be
forced to perform time-consuming manual downloads in order to download
those apps.123 These tying restrictions cause users to disfavor Android devices
that do not have Google Play pre-installed, which reinforces manufacturers’
need to agree to Google’s tying arrangements, perpetuating Google’s
dominance.124
Moreover, Google’s current conduct and Microsoft’s conduct leading up
to the Microsoft case is virtually identical.125 In 2001, Windows OS, created and
distributed by Microsoft, was the operating system that ran on more than 90%
of PCs.126 Microsoft required PC manufacturers to pre-install certain Microsoft
programs on their devices, including Windows Media Player and Internet
Explorer, as a condition of installing Windows OS.127 These programs were
provided free-of-charge to consumers with the purchase of a PC that ran on
Windows OS.128 The D.C. Circuit found that there was strong evidence that
consumers would not switch from the default Windows Media Player or Internet
Explorer, and held that Microsoft’s ties were anticompetitive because they were
capable of foreclosing access to a market for goods or services.129
Similarly, Google ties its apps to Google Play and its version of Android
OS.130 If a manufacturer wants to pre-install these, they must first install Google
Search and Google Chrome, for which competitive alternatives exist.131
Consequently, Google’s practices have reduced incentives for manufacturers to
pre-install competing search and browser apps, and for users to download such
apps, effectively inhibiting rivals from competing with Google. Therefore,
Google has likely violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by tying Google
Play and Google’s Android OS to the pre-installation of Google Search and
Google Chrome.

121. Edelman & Geradin, supra note 98, at 171.
122. Edelman, supra note 57, at 64.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 64–65.
125. See FairSearch Google Android Decision Press Pack, FAIRSEARCH (July 18, 2018),
http://fairsearch.org/fairsearch-google-android-decision-press-pack-18-july-2018/.
126. See Efrati, supra note 27.
127. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84–85 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 89.
130. See FairSearch Google Android Decision Press Pack, supra note 125.
131. Id.
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III. EXCLUSIVE DEALING ARRANGEMENTS WITH MANUFACTURERS
Illegal exclusive dealing is an “agreement between a vendor and a buyer
that prevents the buyer from purchasing a given good from any other vendor,”
thereby foreclosing competition.132 Historically, in determining whether an
exclusive dealing arrangement violated the Sherman Act, courts strictly focused
on foreclosure percentage.133 Since the Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in
Tampa Electric, courts have focused the analysis on whether the arrangement
threatens to create or enhance market power, leading to an anticompetitive
outcome.134
In order to show a violation of Section 1 by exclusive dealing, a plaintiff
must define the relevant market and demonstrate that there is substantial
foreclosure in the relevant market due to the agreements.135 In order to show a
violation of Section 2 by exclusive dealing, a plaintiff must show the defendant
has monopoly power in the relevant market and that the agreements were
anticompetitive, or exclusionary, meaning they contributed to the maintenance
of the monopoly power.136
Google offers RSAs to manufacturers of Android-based devices in
exchange for exclusive default pre-installation of Google Search.137 These
agreements prohibit manufacturers from pre-installing competing search
engines on any of the devices they sell to consumers in exchange for
payments.138 Consequently, manufacturers pre-install Google Search as the only
search engine on all of their devices.139
A. MARKET POWER IN THE INTERNET SEARCH MARKET
The first step in the analysis of a potential exclusive dealing arrangement
is defining the relevant market.140 The relevant product market is internet search,
and the relevant geographic market is nationwide or worldwide because internet
search is a high-technology product.141 Ever since the introduction of Google
Search in 1997, Google has dominated the worldwide search engine market, and
as of July 2019, Google had 88.61% market share.142 In July 2019, market leader

132. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2010).
133. See A.B.A., supra note 39, at 215.
134. See id.
135. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
136. See id. at 51.
137. Federico Etro & Cristina Caffarra, On the Economics of the Android Case, 13 EUR. COMPETITION J.
282, 288 (2017).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 69; see also supra Subpart II.C.
141. See supra Subpart II.C.
142. See J. Clement, Worldwide Desktop Market Share of Leading Search Engines from January 2010 to
July 2019, STATISTA (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwide-market-share-ofsearch-engines/.
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Google generated 62.5% of all internet search queries,143 and accounted for
92.74% of the mobile internet search market in the United States.144 As
evidenced by the statistics above, Google clearly possesses market power in the
relevant market—the internet search market.
B. FORECLOSURE OF COMMERCE
Courts evaluate a variety of market conditions in assessing whether an
exclusive agreement threatens harm to competition. Their inquiry generally
focuses on competitors’ ability to reach the market in the face of the exclusive
deal.145 Injury to competition “does not mean a simple loss of business or even
the demise of a competitor but an impairment of the competitive structure of the
market.”146 A majority of courts agree that the minimum percent of foreclosure
required is 40%.147 The exclusive arrangement must not impose practical
restrictions on a manufacturer’s freedom to purchase from a competitor; if
competitors cannot circumvent the exclusive arrangement to reach the market,
the court may conclude the arrangement harms competition.148 Binding
agreements forcing manufacturers to configure Google Search as the default
search engine position Google to sustain and grow its monopoly in the internet
search market. As Google’s Senior Vice President of Product Management &
Marketing said:
[M]ore users more information, more information more users, more
advertisers more users, more users more advertisers, it’s a beautiful thing,
lather, rinse, repeat, that’s what I do for a living. So that’s[] [why] someone
alluded to the engine that can’t be stopped.149

This is a clear expression of Google’s plan to leverage its power in the
internet search market—Google’s RSAs have succeeded in making it
exceedingly difficult for any other mobile internet search app to gain traction.
An example of the impact these exclusive deals have had on competitors
in the internet search market are the deals between Google and Apple.150 In
143. See J. Clement, Share of Search Queries Handled by Leading U.S. Search Engine Providers as of July
2019, STATISTA (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/267161/market-share-of-search-engines-inthe-united-states/.
144. See J. Clement, Market Share of Selected Leading Mobile Search Providers in the United States from
October 2012 to October 2019, STATISTA (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/511358/marketshare-mobile-search-usa/.
145. See A.B.A., supra note 39, at 216.
146. Stop & Shop v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 373 F.3d 57, 66 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing that a showing
of injury to competition is almost always required because an agreement that caused no harm would not be worth
condemning).
147. See infra text accompanying note 173.
148. See A.B.A., supra note 39, at 217.
149. Jonathan Rosenberg, Google SVP of Product Mgmt & Mktg, Speech at Claremont McKenna College:
Inside the Black Box: Technology and Innovation at Google (Feb. 27, 2008, 12:00 PM) (transcript available at
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//press/podium/pdf/20080227_Jonathan_Rose
nberg_Technology_Innovation.pdf) (emphasis added).
150. See FAIRSEARCH, GOOGLE’S TRANSFORMATION FROM GATEWAY TO GATEKEEPER: HOW GOOGLE’S
EXCLUSIONARY AND ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT RESTRICTS INNOVATION AND DECEIVES CONSUMERS 35

800

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:783

exchange for pre-installing Google Search as the default internet search on
Apple’s iPhone, Google made large payments to Apple in 2007.151 Then, in
2014, Google was estimated to have paid $1 billion to Apple to be the only
default search engine on iPhones and iPads.152 These deals were significant
because approximately 33 million iPhones were purchased in the United States
in 2014,153 and by March 2017, the number of iPhones sold worldwide grew to
1.16 billion.154 By locking up the primary source of queries on mobile devices
through an exclusive search default deal, Google eliminated future sources of
competition and foreclosed rival search engines from fairness in the marketplace
by preventing them the opportunity for distribution on Apple products.155
In 2013, the FTC concluded an extensive investigation into allegations that
Google entered into exclusive agreements for the distribution of Google Search,
but decided not to take action against Google because Google agreed to take
steps to change some of its suspect business practices.156 However, more
recently, in July 2018, the Commission fined Google €4.34 billion for breach of
EU antitrust law.157 One of the violations was due to Google’s illegal payments
to manufacturers for exclusive pre-installation of Google Search across their
entire portfolio of devices that ran on Android OS.158 The Commission found
that these payments foreclosed competition by significantly reducing
manufacturers’ incentives to contract with Google’s competitors and pre-install
their apps.159 The Commission’s July 18, 2018 Press Release provides insight
into the findings of the investigation.
The Commission’s investigation showed that a rival search engine would
have been unable to compensate a device manufacturer . . . for the loss of the
revenue share payments from Google and still make profits. That is because,
even if the rival search engine was pre-installed on only some devices, they
would have to compensate the device manufacturer or mobile network
operator for a loss of revenue share from Google across all devices. 160

(2011),
http://www.fairsearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Googles-Transformation-from-Gateway-toGatekeeper.pdf.
151. Id.
152. Etro & Caffarra, supra note 137, at 288.
153. iPhone Sales Stats, FINDER, https://www.finder.com/iphone-sales-statistics (last updated June 29,
2018).
154. Niall McCarthy, Apple Has Sold 1.2 Billion iPhones Over the Past 10 Years [Infographic], FORBES
(June 29, 2017, 8:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/06/29/apple-has-sold-1-2-billioniphones-over-the-past-10-years-infographic/#6723812042f8.
155. See FAIRSEARCH, supra note 150, at 35.
156. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve
F.T.C. Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online
Search (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-itsbusiness-practices-resolve-ftc.
157. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €4.34 Billion for Illegal
Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google’s Search Engine (July 18,
2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Id.
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This makes clear that Google’s payments were conditioned on the
manufacturer pre-installing only Google Search across all of the Android
devices sold by that manufacturer, a central determination in finding Google’s
conduct illegal. The Commission’s rationale should be taken into account in a
substantial foreclosure analysis.
Moreover, in 2013, around the time when the FTC concluded its
investigation, Google had an almost 10% smaller share of the mobile internet
search market in the United States than it does today.161 In July 2013, Google
accounted for 79.7% of the market, compared to 88.6% in October 2018.162
Additionally, following the EU’s record-breaking antitrust fine imposed on
Google on July 18, 2018, FTC Chairman, Joseph Simons, released a statement
saying he would “take a close look” at the Commission’s decision.163 The
combination of (1) the FTC’s willingness to take another look at Google’s
market position and changes in its business practices, (2) its growth since the
close of the FTC’s last investigation in 2013, and (3) the EU’s €4.34 billion fine
imposed in July 2018, altogether signal that Google’s exclusive dealing
arrangements may well have foreclosed a substantial portion of the internet
search market.
C. HARM TO CONSUMERS
Google’s exclusive deals harm consumers by limiting users’ access to
competing mobile search engines. Although consumers could download and use
substitute search engines, Google’s agreements with manufacturers reduce
consumers’ ability to use and experiment with different search engines due to a
variety of factors such as switching costs, difficulty in accessing them, and
limited storage on their devices.164 The quality of consumers’ internet searches
also suffers. If manufacturers were free to choose a default search engine other
than Google Search, the quality of internet search for users would improve
overall because search engines become smarter and more effective as they
process greater numbers of search queries.165 A vast majority of users do not
download competing apps and simply use the search engine that is pre-installed
by the manufacturer.166 Therefore, search engines that are set as the default on a
device are used significantly more frequently than non-default search engines,
while competing search engines suffer from disuse because consumers would
have to download them and they lack opportunities to become more effective.

161. See Clement, supra note 144.
162. See id.
163. See Greg Sterling, F.T.C. Says It Will Take a “Close Look” at EU Antitrust Fine Against Google,
MARKETING LAND (July 18, 2018, 5:08 PM), https://marketingland.com/ftc-says-it-will-take-a-close-look-at-euantitrust-fine-against-google-244607.
164. Etro & Caffarra, supra note 137, at 289.
165. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 67, at 2.
166. See supra text accompanying note 110.
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Although firms and manufacturers may have procompetitive justifications
for exclusive arrangements—such as ensuring product distributors do not pass
off inferior products as their own, creating reliable and steady outlets for
distributors, and encouraging distributors to promote the manufacturers’
products—the harm to consumers created by Google’s exclusive deals
outweighs any potential justification. Moreover, in its defense in the recent EU
antitrust case, Google claimed that its “payments based on exclusivity were
necessary to convince device manufacturers and mobile network operators to
produce devices for the Android ecosystem.”167 The Commission dismissed this
claim.168
If Google’s competitors were able to secure contracts with manufacturers
in which their internet search products were set as the default, competitors’
search engines would become more effective as they process more queries. This
threat would push Google to utilize resources and make an effort to improve
Google Search. Instead, Google’s RSAs allow it to circumvent these potential
costs by hamstringing manufacturers and blocking competitors from effectively
engaging in the internet search market, to the detriment of consumers. Therefore,
it is likely that Google has restrained trade in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, and has maintained its monopoly in violation of Section 2, by
forcing manufacturers into these exclusive dealing arrangements.
D. MONOPOLY MAINTENANCE THROUGH EXCLUSIVE DEALS
Exclusive dealing raises competitive concerns, so even if a dominant firm
is not found to have violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, it may still violate
Section 2.169 This is because the minimum amount of foreclosure required to
suggest a Section 1 violation for exclusive dealing has dramatically increased
over time.170 In 1949, when the Supreme Court addressed exclusive dealing in
Standard Oil Co., it held that a 6.7% foreclosure of a market was unlawful.171 In
contrast, in her 1984 Jefferson Parish concurrence, Justice O’Connor expressed
no concern with a situation in which a firm with a 30% market share had
exclusive dealing arrangements.172 Since Jefferson Parish, courts have said that
the standard minimum percentage of foreclosure required is 40%, favoring
defendants in exclusive dealing cases.173 Courts have credited multiple factors,
such as procompetitive justifications, duration of exclusivity, and ease of
termination of the agreement in making the foreclosure standard more difficult
167. See European Comm’n, supra note 157.
168. See id.
169. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
170. Steve Calkins, Professor of Law and Dir. of Graduate Studies at Wayne State Univ. Law Sch., Speech
at Hous. B. Ass’n, Evaluating the Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing Agreements (June 24, 2005),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/.Nov05_Telesem11_29.authcheckd
am.pdf).
171. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
172. See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45–46 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
173. See Calkins, supra note 170.
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for plaintiffs to overcome. Despite this challenge, Google’s exclusive deals
allow it to maintain its monopoly in violation of Section 2, even if the deals do
not illegally restrain trade under Section 1.
The Microsoft case provides an example of where a firm was held liable
under Section 2 for exclusive dealing, but not Section 1.174 At the trial court
level, the plaintiff in Microsoft lost on its Section 1 exclusive dealing claim.175
The court ruled that because rivals were not completely barred from reaching
consumers, Microsoft did not illegally restrain trade through its exclusive
agreements with manufacturers.176 On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit held
that Microsoft violated Section 2 because its exclusive deals were illegal
anticompetitive acts of monopoly maintenance.177
In its opinion, the D.C. Circuit addressed the differences between exclusive
dealing under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.178 It stated that the basic
concerns relevant to both sections are the same, but “a monopolist’s use of
exclusive contracts, in certain circumstances, may give rise to a [Section] 2
violation even though the contracts foreclose less than the roughly 40% or 50%
share usually required in order to establish a [Section] 1 violation.”179
Microsoft’s exclusive dealing agreements prevented manufacturers from
installing rival browsers to Internet Explorer, thereby protecting Microsoft’s
monopoly.180 In its defense, Microsoft argued that the restrictions did not
completely block its competitor, Netscape, from distributing its browser.181 The
D.C. Circuit found this claim insufficient to shield it from Section 2 liability
because “although Microsoft did not bar its rivals from all means of distribution,
it did bar them from the cost-efficient ones.”182
Because Google’s exclusive dealing arrangements are similar to those in
Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit’s rationale should provide a framework for analysis
in a potential case against Google. Under Google’s RSAs, manufacturers agree
to pre-install Google Search as the default search engine on all of their devices
in exchange for large payments.183 Just as Microsoft had set Internet Explorer as
the default browser, Google has set Google Search as the default search engine
via its RSAs. Even if Google provides enough evidence to support a defense that
its exclusive arrangements do not block rival search engine providers from all
channels of distribution, following the precedent in Microsoft, Google may still
violate Section 2.

174. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
175. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 51–54 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
176. See id. at 53.
177. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 46.
178. See id. at 70.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 61.
181. Id. at 64.
182. Id.
183. See FAIRSEARCH, supra note 150, at 35.
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Google makes enormous profits by having a significant data scale
advantage over its competitors in the internet search market, and the more data
it is able to collect from search queries, the more data it can use to sell targeted
advertising. Through its exclusivity payments, Google ensures access to user
data obtained through internet searches on Android devices. Therefore, even if
Google proves that it does not bar its rivals from all means of distribution, it at
the very least bars them from the cost-efficient ones. This effectively limits
competitors’ ability to reach the market in the face of Google’s exclusive dealing
arrangements and allows it to maintain its monopoly in violation of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act.
IV. OBSTRUCTION OF COMPETING ANDROID OPERATING SYSTEMS
Google promotes Android as an open-source operating system.184 Opensource operating systems allow anyone to use and customize the software,
whereas closed-source operating systems do not.185 An example of a closedsource operating system is Apple’s iOS, the use of which allows Apple to control
every aspect of its devices.186 A software platform is a two-sided market,
meaning revenues can be realized on the manufacturer’s side (as buyers), or on
the side of the app developers (as sellers).187 Google does not charge
manufacturers to install Google’s version of Android or its apps,188 but it does
charge app developers and in-app advertisers for bringing their offerings to
market through Google Play.189 Google’s business model illustrates how the
open-source nature of Android and its free provision of Google apps were crucial
factors leading to Google’s dominance in the markets for Android operating
systems and Android-compatible app stores.190
Alternative modes of Android OS can be created by anyone because
Android is open-source. An individual can make changes to Google’s version of
Android OS by downloading the code to use as a base to expand on it. The
Android Open Source Project website contains all of the information and source
code needed to do so.191 When someone takes existing code and creates an

184. See Opportunity. Powered by Choice, ANDROID https://www.android.com/everyone/enablingopportunity/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
185. Amir Efrati, Google’s Confidential Android Contracts Show Rising Requirements, INFO. (Sept. 26,
2014, 7:25 AM), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/Google-s-Confidential-Android-Contracts-ShowRising-Requirements.
186. See Tim Worstall, The Problem with Apple’s Closed Apps Universe, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2012, 12:44
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/08/31/the-problem-with-apples-closed-apps-universe/
#c16effb794ba.
187. Etro & Caffarra, supra note 137, at 285.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 286.
191. See About the Android Open Source Project, ANDROID https://source.android.com/ (last visited Mar.
20, 2020).
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independent project based on it, a “fork” is created.192 Google protects its
dominant position by closing and controlling its Android OS through its Android
Compatibility Program and AFAs, which prevent manufacturers from using
these alternative Android OS forks.193
Google’s Android Compatibility Program contains a set of technical
requirements that manufacturers are required to comply with before their devices
can be branded as “Android” devices.194 Until recently, device manufacturers
could choose from a variety of Android operating systems and a variety of opensource alternatives to Google’s version of Android OS. Now, manufacturers
must certify that their devices follow Google’s strict regulations before they are
permitted to license core Android apps and use the “Android” trademark;
without these, their devices are unlikely to establish commercial traction.195 One
of the key provisions in Google’s MADA, which grants manufacturers the
license to pre-install and distribute Google apps, explicitly prohibits
manufacturers from endorsing forked versions of Android OS:
Company shall not, and shall not allow any third party to . . . take any actions
that may cause or result in the fragmentation of Android, including but not
limited to the distribution by Company of a software development kit (SDK)
derived from Android.196

Access to Google’s apps and use of the mark “Android” is critical for
manufacturers’ devices to be competitive in the marketplace. Manufacturers are
thereby forcibly compelled to accept Google’s terms, including the prohibition
against promoting the fragmentation of Android OS.
Another contractual requirement that Google has imposed since the very
first day Android launched in 2008 is the AFA.197 AFAs apply additional terms
that explicitly limit the ability of device manufacturers to distribute independent
devices that rely on forks of Android OS by forcing them to use only Google’s
version of Android.198 By controlling Android OS in these ways, Google not
only retains command of determining which apps are provided on Android
devices, but also substantially limits the forks, or modes, in which Android
runs.199
Google’s prohibition against forking is anticompetitive conduct that likely
violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act. A Section 2 violation is established when
two elements are met: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
192. See Jerry Hildenbrand, What the Fork Is a “Fork?”, ANDROIDCENTRAL (Apr. 6, 2013),
https://www.androidcentral.com/what-fork-fork.
193. See FAIRSEARCH, supra note 150, at 35.
194. See Android Compatibility Program Overview, ANDROID https://source.android.com/compatibility/
overview (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
195. See FAIRSEARCH, supra note 150, at 35.
196. Exhibit B to Class Action Complaint, supra note 68, at 3.
197. See Mark MacCarthy, Open Source Mobile Operating Systems Need to Control Fragmentation, CIO
(July 12, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.cio.com/article/3289504/open-source-mobile-operating-systems-needto-control-fragmentation.html.
198. See id.
199. See FAIRSEARCH, supra note 150, at 35.
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market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”200
A. MONOPOLY POWER IN THE MOBILE DEVICE OPERATING SYSTEM MARKET
As previously noted, the first step in proving a Section 2 claim is to provide
evidence of monopoly power in the relevant market.201 For the purposes of this
analysis, the product market is the mobile device operating system market, and
the geographic market is nationwide or worldwide because operating systems
are high-technology products.202 To determine whether a firm has monopoly
power in a market, courts consider circumstantial evidence of the firm’s ability
to control prices or exclude competition, and a significant indicator is market
share.203 A market share in excess of 70% generally establishes a prima facie
case of monopoly power in the United States, and a market share between 50–
75% has been sufficient in establishing a Section 2 claim in a complaint.204
Android is used by 2 billion people around the world.205 Its market share in the
mobile device operating system market worldwide is between 76.24% and
85.9%.206 These statistics demonstrate that Android is clearly the most popular
operating system in the world, and support a prima facie finding of monopoly
power.
B. MONOPOLY MAINTENANCE THROUGH EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
As mentioned, the possession of monopoly power alone does not violate
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.207 A business with monopoly power must illegally
enhance or maintain its monopoly through deliberate anticompetitive, or
exclusionary, conduct.208 Courts agree that not all aggressive business conduct
should be considered exclusionary, but have declined to define any bright line
rules because of the difficulty in distinguishing between procompetitive conduct
and anticompetitive conduct. This analysis is challenging because both types of
conduct can have the apparent effect of forcing competitors out of the market.209
However, a few factors have often appeared in courts’ analyses of whether
200. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); see also supra notes 136, 140 and
accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 136, 140 and accompanying text.
202. See generally United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 197 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing how
technology products should be assessed by the total measure of nationwide economic harm).
203. See A.B.A., supra note 39, at 231.
204. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
205. Vlad Savov, Android’s Trust Problem Isn’t Getting Better, VERGE (Apr. 13, 2018, 9:12 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/13/17233122/android-software-patch-trust-problem.
206. See supra notes 93, 95 and accompanying text.
207. See A.B.A., supra note 39, at 240; see also supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text.
208. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)
(“[T]he possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.”).
209. See A.B.A., supra note 39, at 242.
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conduct is exclusionary, including: (1) the defendant’s intent, (2) the defendant’s
justification for its conduct, and (3) the effect of the conduct and the sufficiency
of the evidence that the defendant has caused, or is likely to cause, monopoly
power to be acquired, enhanced, or maintained.210
1. Intent
The first factor, the defendant’s intent, is relevant to the exclusionary
conduct analysis to the extent that it helps the court understand the likely effect
of the monopolist’s conduct.211 General intent to defeat competitors and obtain
monopoly status in a market is not sufficient, standing alone, to violate antitrust
law, because the goal of every business is to win the competitive battle.212
Rather, intent may be relevant if the purpose of the firm’s conduct was to exclude
rivals on a basis other than efficiency.213
Google’s course of conduct demonstrates Google’s realization that
Android forks could be a threat to its dominance if product distributors were able
to successfully sell devices that do not include Google’s apps in the United
States. For example, in China, many of Google’s services are blocked, so
Android forks are popular among consumers.214 This threat is Google’s
underlying concern and motivation in requiring manufacturers to sign AFAs.
Through these agreements, Google is attempting to inhibit new devices from
excluding Google’s apps and Google’s version of Android OS. In addition,
Google has recently limited access to updated versions of its apps to only those
manufacturers that sign AFAs, making Android forks less attractive to
consumers in the United States, where Google’s services are not blocked.215 As
a result, manufacturers are forced to sign restrictive AFAs with Google or build
smartphones without the latest Android technology and services.
It is likely that Google’s purpose in creating the AFAs was to use its
popularity with consumers in the United States as leverage to exclude
competition. Google Play, which delivers over 95% of apps downloaded to
Android smartphones,216 is clearly an all-important feature for device
manufacturers to include with their products. Google is aware that Google Play
and various other Google apps are ‘must haves’ for Android smartphones, and
consequently has used this dominance to influence manufacturers. In order for
their products to be branded as “Android” devices and to include these essential
Google apps, manufacturers have no choice but to agree not to use or promote
Android forks in the devices they sell to consumers. It is unlikely that Google’s
210. See id. at 243–45.
211. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
212. See Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883 F.2d 1101, 1113 (1st Cir.
1989) (“[D]esire to crush a competitor, standing alone, is insufficient to make out a violation of the antitrust
laws.”); see also A.B.A., supra note 39, at 244.
213. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985).
214. See Efrati, supra note 27.
215. See id.
216. See Sayer, supra note 92.
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intent in generating this result was to increase the efficiency of its version of
Android OS. If its intent was efficiency, it would not use its popular apps as
leverage over device manufacturers. Rather, Google’s AFAs propagate its
intent: to allow Google to maintain its monopoly by obstructing the development
and distribution of competitors’ versions of Android OS.
2. Justifications Do Not Outweigh Harm
The second factor, the defendant’s justification for its conduct, is weighed
based on multiple considerations such as the legitimacy and significance of the
defendant’s proffered business justification, its relation to the conduct at issue,
and the availability of less restrictive alternatives that can achieve the same
result.217 In addition, the conduct cannot be more restrictive than reasonably
necessary for competition on the merits.218
According to Google’s Android Open Source Project website, “[a]s an
open source project, Android’s goal is to avoid any central point of failure in
which one industry player can restrict or control the innovations of any other
player.”219 However, open-source systems are vulnerable to development into
rival versions—“[w]hen anyone can amend the source code, it is hard to
maintain the unity and coherence of the program” because changes in the code
may make “it incompatible with all other versions of the program.”220 Google’s
position is that the restrictions placed on manufacturers through the AFAs are
necessary to prevent fragmentation of the Android ecosystem.221 Mobile
platform fragmentation occurs when some users run older versions of an
operating system, while other users actively run newer versions of the same
operating system.222 In November 2017, over half of all Android devices,
approximately 1 billion, were more than two years out-of-date.223 If Android’s
fragmentation continues, Google maintains that the benefits of open-source
programs to consumers, such as security, consistent user experience, and
functionality, would dissipate because of the lack of a cohesive Android
platform.224
Although Google’s concerns are valid, its cited issues do not outweigh the
harm that is created by requiring manufacturers to sign the AFAs. Google’s
prohibition on the development of Android forks results in the inability of

217. See id.
218. See United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1193 (D. Kan. 2001) (citing Instructional Sys.
Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639, 649 (10th Cir. 1987)).
219. See About the Android Open Source Project, supra note 191.
220. MacCarthy, supra note 197.
221. See European Comm’n, supra note 157.
222. See Rayna Hollander, Android Fragmentation Is Worsening, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 6:54 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/android-fragmentation-is-worsening-2017-11.
223. See id.
224. See MacCarthy, supra note 197; see also Simon Hill, What Is Android Fragmentation, and Can Google
Ever Fix It?, DIGITAL TRENDS (Oct. 31, 2018, 7:35 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/what-isandroid-fragmentation-and-can-google-ever-fix-it/.
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manufacturers to develop and distribute alternative versions of Android and
alternative apps, thereby inhibiting creativity and innovation. Intentionally
preventing compatibility between apps and platforms in such a manner has been
found to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit held Microsoft liable under Section 2 for
deceiving Java app developers into generating apps that were dependent on
Windows OS and incompatible with other operating systems.225 Microsoft’s
goal in doing so was to prevent cross-platform uses of Java, thereby protecting
Windows’ monopoly in the operating system market.226 Microsoft engaged in
illegal monopoly maintenance by restricting the development of apps and
minimizing competitors’ influence in the market.227 By preventing the
distribution and usefulness of Android forks, Google’s AFAs have a similar
effect on the mobile device operating system market.
Additionally, Microsoft was held liable for another Section 2 violation for
entering into First Wave Agreements (FWAs) with manufacturers to use only
Microsoft’s Java Virtual Machine (JVM) program.228 Under these FWAs,
manufacturers agreed to make their Java apps reliant on Windows-specific
technology and to refrain from distributing JVM programs that were compatible
with the technology of Microsoft’s competitors.229 This anticompetitive conduct
that Microsoft engaged in parallels Google’s current conduct. Google justifies
its restraint on creativity by maintaining that the AFAs and Google’s new app
restrictions protect Android OS from fragmentation.230 This reasoning parallels
one of Microsoft’s defenses of its FWA contracts. Microsoft claimed that the
FWAs were a practical solution to ensuring uniformity and efficiency in order
to benefit consumers.231 Google claims that its actions benefit consumers by
ensuring that apps run seamlessly across all devices using the Android OS.232
However, the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft rejected this claim and held that the
FWAs significantly precluded the development and distribution of alternative
versions of the JVM program, thus illegally protecting Microsoft’s monopoly
from threats of competition.233 Along similar lines, Google’s stifling of
competition and diminishing of incentives to innovate result in far greater harm
to consumers than any legitimate, procompetitive benefits that may arise.
There are less-restrictive alternatives to AFAs that Google can adopt to
combat fragmentation of Android OS. Preventing the emergence of Android
forks is not necessary for Google to ensure that devices using its version of

225. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 76–77 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
226. See id.
227. See id. at 77–78.
228. See id. at 75–76.
229. See id.
230. See Device Compatibility Overview, ANDROID https://developer.android.com/guide/practices/
compatibility (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
231. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 75.
232. See Device Compatibility Overview, supra note 230.
233. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 75–76.
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Android are compliant with its technical requirements.234 Google can implement
updated procedures for its apps and version of Android OS to ensure reliability
without tightening its grip on Android and using compatibility as leverage to get
manufacturers to do what they want. It is also important to note that Google has
not had much pressure to arrive at a solution to fragmentation because “Android
isn’t, by any means, losing steam, and users haven’t exactly grabbed pitchforks
and showed up to Mountain View demanding change.”235
3. Enhancement and Maintenance of Monopoly Power
The third factor that has appeared frequently in courts’ analyses of whether
conduct is exclusionary is the sufficiency of evidence showing that the conduct
has, or is likely to, cause monopoly power to be acquired, enhanced, or
maintained.236 In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit held that causation may be inferred
when “exclusionary conduct is aimed at producers of nascent competitive
technologies as well as when it is aimed at producers of established
substitutes.”237 The court realized that it would be unreasonable to require
Section 2 liability to turn on a plaintiff’s inability to reconstruct the hypothetical
marketplace that would have existed without the defendant’s anticompetitive
conduct.238
Given this issue, the D.C. Circuit’s test for causation was not whether the
competing products would actually have developed into viable substitutes for
Microsoft’s dominant product.239 Instead, the court’s analysis focused on (1)
whether “the exclusion of nascent threats [was] the type of conduct that [was]
reasonably capable of contributing significantly” to Microsoft’s continued
monopoly power, and (2) whether the competing products “reasonably
constituted nascent threats at the time Microsoft engaged in the anticompetitive
conduct at issue.”240 Under this framework, the D.C. Circuit held that (1) the
entire purpose of the Sherman Act is to prevent monopolists from having free
reign to destroy nascent competitors at will, particularly in a fast-paced
technology industry, and (2) the District Court made sufficient findings showing
that Microsoft’s competitors had potential to threaten Microsoft’s dominant
product in the marketplace.241
In applying the Microsoft framework in a case against Google, it is
necessary to show that at the time Google obstructed the development and
distribution of alternative versions of Android OS, competitors had the potential
to threaten Google’s dominance. If Google did not prohibit Android forks,
234. See European Comm’n, supra note 157.
235. Rithvik Rao, What Is Android Fragmentation, and Can Google Fix It?, ANDROID AUTHORITY (Sept.
5, 2016), https://www.androidauthority.com/android-fragmentation-google-fix-it-713210/.
236. See A.B.A., supra note 39, at 244.
237. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 79.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.

April 2020]

GOOGLE: DO NOT PASS GO

811

Amazon’s Fire OS, a version of Android, could have been a rival. Shortly after
its launch in 2014, Amazon was forced to take a $170 million write-down charge
on costs related to Fire OS while still having $83 million worth of devices in its
inventory.242 Fire OS devices did not offer Google Play, use the “Android”
trademark, or come pre-installed with any of Google’s proprietary apps.243 They
used Amazon’s app store, which has about 240,000 apps, a paltry amount
compared to the over 1 million apps on the Google Play store in 2014.244
Because Fire OS devices did not come pre-installed with popular services
provided by Google’s proprietary apps, consumers were deterred by the fact that
access to Google’s services was cumbersome.245 It is also important to note that
as part of its validation in fining Google €4.34 billion for antitrust violations in
July 2018, the Commission said that it “found evidence that Google’s conduct
prevented a number of large manufacturers from developing and selling devices
based on Amazon’s Android fork called ‘Fire OS.’”246 Fire OS could have been
a potential threat to Google’s dominance in the mobile device operating system
market in the United States as an alternative Android OS platform and could
have provided a platform for rival search engines and apps to gain more
traffic.247 The failure of potential rivals like Fire OS in the mobile device
operating system market is evidence that Google’s prohibitions on forking have
helped it maintain its monopoly power.
Google’s conduct has allowed it to maintain its monopoly power, and this
conduct is likely to continue to enhance its power. Consumers will continue to
suffer from fewer and fewer choices and stagnant product development.
Additionally, if Google succeeds in totally eliminating the competition in the
mobile device operating system market, it will have the complete freedom to
charge higher prices for its version of Android OS.
In the past, Google has abruptly imposed a price on a marketing platform
product it had once offered for free—Google Analytics (“Analytics”). When
Google introduced Analytics in 2005, there was healthy competition and
innovation in the market for web analytics.248 All of Analytics’ features were
given to users for free, and what had once been a flourishing market quickly
became the opposite.249 Once its rivals had been forced out of the market,
Google suddenly hiked its price and began charging “premium” users who

242. See Victor Luckerson, 4 Reasons Amazon’s Fire Phone Was a Flop, TIME (Oct. 24, 2014),
http://time.com/3536969/amazon-fire-phone-bust/.
243. See id.
244. Id. As of March 20, 2020, there are 2,868,939 Android apps on Google Play, according to AppBrain.
See Number of Android Apps on Google Play, APPBRAIN, https://www.appbrain.com/stats/number-of-androidapps (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
245. See Luckerson, supra note 242.
246. European Comm’n, supra note 157.
247. See Barker & Khan, supra note 108.
248. See Google Analytics Is 10 Year Old—What’s Changed?, BRIAN CLIFTON, https://brianclifton.com/
blog/2015/11/10/google-analytics-is-10-what-has-changed/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
249. Id.
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wanted advanced features a $150,000 annual fee for a product that gained
dominance because it had been offered for free.250
If Google is allowed to continue its prohibition on Android forks,
competition in the mobile device operating system market will continue to
dissolve and it will gain an even greater monopoly. With no competitive forces
to pressure Google, Google will have the freedom to charge users for Android,
just as it did with Analytics. For the aforementioned reasons, and in conformity
with the Microsoft decision, Google has likely violated Section 2 of the Sherman
Act by obstructing the development and distribution of Android forks.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to promote competition, consumer
welfare, and innovation. Consumers are deprived of meaningful options as
Google starves potential competitors of the opportunities and resources to create
and provide viable options for society. Google should be required to end the
tying of Google Search and Google Chrome to Google Play and its version of
Android OS, withdraw its contracts with manufacturers that make payments
conditional on exclusive pre-installation of Google Search, and cease restrictive
practices that prevent manufacturers from selling devices that run on alternative
versions of Android OS. These steps are necessary to restore competition vital
to the digital economy.

250. See generally Iris Hearn, Is Google Analytics
https://www.impactbnd.com/blog/is-google-analytics-free.
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